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ESTABLISHING A MARRIAGE LIKE RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO THE
SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE WAS A CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHICH CREATED A MANIFEST INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY IN THE
PROPERTY DIVISION
On October 5, 1984, the Plaintiff/Respondent, Helen Jane
Walters, and the Defendant/Appellant, Lewis Mark Walters, were
married.

On November 10, 1987, the parties separated.

The trial

court established that a marital relationship began on or about
January 1, 1980. (R.99).
From

this

established

date, the Court

divided

property which was acquired or paid for by the parties.

the

(R.101).

Such division of property resulted in a manifest injustice to the
Defendant.
1

During the course of the trial, the Plaintiff went to
great lengths to establish that a marital relationship took place
years before the marriage was actually solemnized.

The Court in

fact did determine that a marital relationship began on or about
January 1, 1980. (R.99, 150-152). From this date the Court divided
the marital property to approximate "a near equal division of the
monetary values of the properties." (R.160).

Such division of

property failed to adequately credit the Defendant for the separate
property that he brought into the marriage.
The

Plaintiff

argues

that

explicitly nor implicitly attempted

the

trial

Court

neither

to legitimize the parties

common law relationship and did not apply §30-1-4.5, Utah Code
Annotated, Utah's "common law marriage" statute.

It is evident,

however, from the course of the proceedings and the Court's
decision, that a common law marriage was indeed established on
January 1, 1980, which had a significant bearing on the division
of property. The facts and conduct of the Court are significantly
different than Barber v. Barber, 134 Utah Adv. Rpt. 26 (Utah App.
1990) which the Plaintiff points to. In Barber the trial Court did
not find a marital

relationship prior

to the marriage being

solemnized and did not use such finding in the distribution of the
property.
From the Court's Memorandum Decision dated February 15,
2

1987, (R.99-100) a number of factors were considered in determining
that a marital relationship began on or about January 1, 1980. The
Court considered

M

the fact that the Defendant

stayed

in the

Plaintiff's trailer with her when he was not working out of state.
The Defendant had the Plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which
he was paying forf and did not charge rent.

The Plaintiff made

improvements on the property such as would be expected of a married
couple. The Defendant paid debts and obligations for the Plaintiff
including

substantial

debts

to

the

IRS

and

the

State

Tax

Commission. The Plaintiff's child with the Defendant's consent was
enrolled in school under the name Walters.

While working out of

state, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff money to live on." (R.99100) .
Having considered the parties to have begun their marital
relationship on January 1, 1980, the Court awarded the Plaintiff
her share of the Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the
existence of the marriage.

According to the formula outlined in

Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).

(R.100).

Then, having considered when the real properties were obtained, and
how they were paid for, the Court divided the real property.
(R.101).
The Defendant disagrees with the Court's finding that a
marital relationship began in 1980.
3

Before the solemnization of

the marriage, the parties rarely lived with each other as the
Defendant was living out of state working on TDY assignments. The
Defendant only made infrequent returns to Utah. The Defendant also
argues that the trial Court clearly abused its discretion in
distributing the property. Primarily, it was inequitable to award
the Plaintiff a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued
prior to October 5, 1984, (the date the marriage was solemnized)
and the Pleasant Grove real property acquired by the Defendant
prior to this date.
The Defendant recognizes that under proper circumstances,
premarital or separate property may "be subject to equitable
division upon divorce".

Barber, supra at 26. However, under the

particular circumstances at hand, the circumstances were not proper
to award the Plaintiff a share of the Defendant's retirement
benefits earned and the real property acquired by the Defendant
prior to the solemnization of the marriage.
There is no equitable reason to award the Defendant a
share of Defendant's retirement benefits earned prior to October
5, 1984.

The Court clearly recognized a common law marriage by

awarding such.

Under the holdings of Layton v. Layton, 777 P2d

504 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P2d 1177
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), the trial court's order in this matter was
clearly erroneous. Utah's common law marriage statute, §30-1-4.5,
4

Utah Code Annotated, did not become effective until 1987 and is not
to be applied retroactively.
It can be imputed that the same rationale was used by the
Court in awarding the real property.
Decision

states

that

a primary

properties were obtained.11

The Court's Memorandum

consideration

was

"when

the

(R.101). With this in mind, the Court

divided the realty in a way it believed approximated "a near equal
division of the monetary values of the properties." (R.160).

It

is evident that the Court did not treat the property in question
as premarital or separate property but as marital property.
"As a general rule, equity requires that each party
retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage."
Hamont v. Hamont, 135 Utah Adv.Rpt. 59, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Painter v. Painter, 752 P2d 907, 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
general

rule

circumstances.

is

to

be

followed

unless

there

are

This
unique

The circumstances relied on by the trial court in

the instant case were not unique in nature to merit awarding the
Plaintiff the property in Pleasant Grove free and clear. (R.101).
Such property was acquired by the Defendant in May of 1980 prior
to the marriage.

The Plaintiff was permitted to move her trailer

onto this property rent free. When the Defendant was on temporary
duty (TDY) assignments, the Plaintiff arranged for making physical
improvements

to

the

Defendant's
5

realty

pursuant

to

his

instructions. (R.151).

Such improvements were all paid for by the

Defendant.
The Plaintiff derived great benefit from living on said
property prior to the marriage.
rent

by

the

Defendant,

In addition to not being charged

she

also

contributions made by the Defendant
expenses she had incurred.

benefited

greatly

from

in paying off debts and

She also received monies from the

Defendant when he was on TDY assignments.

The circumstances were

not unique in nature to merit awarding the Plaintiff an equitable
interest

in

the

Pleasant

Grove

property

in

question.

The

distribution made by the trial court resulted in a "manifest
injustice or inequity" with regards to the Defendant's premarital
property. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P2d 1369, 1373 (1988).
CONCLUSION
The property division made by the trial Court manifests
an injustice and inequity toward the Defendant.

He earned and

acquired

prior

retirement

benefits and

real property

solemnization of the marriage between the parties.

to the

The Plaintiff

was not entitled to an equitable interest in such benefits or
property.
It is clear that the trial Court recognized that a
marital relationship was established in 1980 though the parties
were not married until 1984. Though the Court never specifically
6

referred to Utah's common law marriage statute §30-1-4.5, Utah Code
Annotated, it is evident that the Court recognized the marital
relationship established in 1980 in distributing the property.
§30-1-4.5 did not become effective until 1987, and according to
Layton, supra, it is not to have retroactive effect.
As a result of the trial Court's property distribution,
the Defendant was not adequately credited the separate property of
which he brought

into the marriage.

The circumstances were

insufficient and not unique in nature to award the Plaintiff an
equitable interest. Her efforts were insubstantial in contributing
to the enhancement of the Defendant's separate property as the
Defendant paid for all of the improvements and authorized and
instructed the Plaintiff to make the appropriate arrangements.
The objective of a property distribution is to achieve
a fair, just and equitable result in a divorce action.

The

Defendant/Appellant prays this Court to hold that the District
Court abused its discretion in distributing the property which
resulted in a manifest injustice and inequity.

It is appropriate

for this case to be remanded for proper distribution of the real
property and retirement benefits acquired by the Defendant prior
to the solemnization of the marriage.

7

DATED this

JJ£

day of August, 1990.

Roberi
TAYLOR, MOODY & TflORNE
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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